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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1
provides funding for special education along with a detailed set of
requirements for state and local agencies. 2 For example, it specifies
various procedural safeguards, including the right to an impartial
hearing.3 The IDEA has been the avenue of frequent litigation.4 Due
to the rather robust application of the exhaustion doctrine in IDEA
cases,5 the impartial hearing is, for the most part, the exclusive
* Perry A. Zirkel (Ph.D., J.D., U. Connecticut; LL.M., Yale U.) is university
professor emeritus of education and law at Lehigh University where he formerly
was dean of the College of Education and more recently held the Iacocca Chair in
Education for its five-year term. He has a Ph.D. in Educational Administration and
a J.D. from the University of Connecticut, and a Master of Laws degree from Yale
University. He has written more than 1,450 publications on various aspects of
school law, with an emphasis on legal issues in special education.
1
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2012). Originally enacted as the Education of the
Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 1725 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
2
See generally Perry A. Zirkel, A Comprehensive Comparison of the IDEA
and Section 504/ADA, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 767 (2012), for a systematic overview of
the various features of the IDEA, including the procedural safeguards, in
comparison to Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
3
20 U.S.C § 1415(f); see also Zirkel, supra note 2, at 768; see generally Perry
A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA: A State-byState Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2010) (snapshot of the varying state
systems administrative adjudications for the IDEA pursuant to cooperative
federalism); Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping
Judicialization of Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007) (tracing gradual legalization of the impartial
hearing process under the IDEA).
4
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The "Explosion" in Education
Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (revealing the
upward trajectory of IDEA litigation within the relatively level trend of K–12
litigation within the past three decades); Tessie Rose Bailey & Perry A. Zirkel,
Frequency Trends of Court Decisions under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 28 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 3 (2015) (computing states’
relative IDEA judicial decisions rankings); cf. Perry A. Zirkel, Longitudinal Trends
in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) (computing the
relative rankings of the states for due process hearing decisions under the IDEA).
5
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012).
See Louis Wasserman, Delineating
Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing Federal Courts'
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gateway for IDEA litigation.6
In turn, one of the significant threshold issues for the impartial
hearing is the applicable statute of limitations (SOL), including its
starting point, duration, and effect. The recent Third Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District
Authority7 illustrates the SOL’s high-stakes significance under the
IDEA for plaintiff parents, defendant districts, and impartial hearing
officers (IHOs). Assessing the decision’s importance and potential
implications requires a systematic, comprehensive, and relatively
concise canvassing of the relevant IDEA provisions and related case
law. The frame of reference for this case law analysis is the
prevailing practice of IHOs to apply the SOL as the window for the
issues and, for the most part, the evidence and relief under the IDEA.
Prior to the 2004 amendment of the IDEA,8 the statute and its
extensive regulations9 were silent regarding the SOL at the hearing
level. Because most jurisdictions lacked a corollary state law
addressing the SOL at the hearing level, courts utilized a borrowing
approach to fill this gap based on the applicable state’s analogous
law, resulting in a wide variety of results.10

Jurisdiction under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from
the Case Law and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 349 (2009), for a comprehensive overview, including the relatively
narrow exceptions, of this exhaustion provision as applied to IDEA claims. The
application to this provision to non-IDEA claims is a separate matter, although it
reinforces its relative rigorousness. See, e.g., Peter J. Maher, Caution on
Exhaustion: The Courts' Misinterpretation of the IDEA's Exhaustion Requirement
for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA But Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259 (2011). Finally, for the
intersection of exhaustion and SOL, see, e.g., Molina v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Lunas
Sch., 67 IDELR ¶ 18 (D.N.M. 2015).
6
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: A
Follow-Up Analysis, 303 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014); Perry A. Zirkel, Longitudinal
Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014)
(computing states’ relative IDEA due process hearing decisions rankings).
7
802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015). A month after the decision, the Third Circuit
denied the defending district’s motion for rehearing en banc.
8
118 Stat. 2647, 2803 (P.L 108-446, § 302(a)(1)) (Dec. 4, 2004).
9
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.818 (2014).
10
See Perry A. Zirkel & Peter J. Maher, The Statute of Limitations under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 175 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2003), for a
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However, the 2004 IDEA amendment filled this gap, providing
SOL provisions for both the hearing and judicial levels.11 The
purpose of this article, in light of the practical significance and the
limited literature addressing the IDEA’s hearing level SOL,12 is to
provide a current and concise overview of the case law addressing
this specific issue.13 Part I provides the basic nature and purpose of

snapshot of each state’s pre-IDEA SOL period for both the hearing and court
levels.
11
See infra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text, for impartial hearings SOL.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) for the judicial level SOL which requires filing for
judicial review within ninety days of the IHO’s decision unless a state law specifies
a different period.
12
See, e.g., Jennifer R. Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations
Decisions Cement Second Class Remedial Scheme for Low Income Children with
Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599 (2013) (advocating for
Congress and the courts to adopt the approach that the IDEA statute of limitations
constitute a filing deadline that does not limit the scope of compensatory education
relief).
13
In contrast, the scope of this article does not extend to the more extensive
case law concerning the IDEA SOL for the judicial stage generally. See, e.g.,
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014); M.R. v. Ridley
Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014); J.H. v. Nevada City Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR
¶ 77 (D. Nev. 2015); Boatright v. Sch. Bd. of Polk Cnty., 52 IDELR ¶ 101 (M.D.
Fla. 2009); cf. Piazza v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 669
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (SOL for unexhausted claims). Moreover, it does not extend to
the even more extensive case law concerning the IDEA SOL for the judicial stage
as applied to attorneys’ fees claims. See, e.g., D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch.
Dist., 806 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2015); Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., 792
F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2015); Walhovd v. Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist., 526 F. App’x
803 (9th Cir. 2013); Bd. of Educ. of Evanston-Skokie Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. v.
Luca, 66 IDELR ¶ 135 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 80 F. Supp. 3d
332 (D. Mass. 2015); Brittany O. v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 299 (E.D.
Ark. 2015); Concepcion-Torres v. Puerto Rico, 43 F. Supp.3d 170 (D.P.R. 2014);
Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 64 IDELR ¶ 10 (D.D.C. 2014); T.T. v. Cnty. of
Marin, 62 IDELR ¶ 49 (N.D. Cal. 2013); C.L. v. Lucia Mar Cent. Sch. Dist., 61
IDELR ¶ 224 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Toledo, 950 F.
Supp. 2d 246 (N.D. Ohio 2013); Northport Pub. Sch. v. Woods, 60 IDELR ¶ 154
(W.D. Mich. 2013). Another such exclusion is for the SOL for student claims
under section 504 of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., P.P. v. W.
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727 (3d Cir. 2009); Ripple v. Marble Falls Indep.
Sch. Dist., 99 F. Supp. 3d 662 (W.D. Tex. 2015); T.L. v. Sherwood Charter Sch.,
62 IDELR ¶ 284 (D. Or. 2014); Pagan-Negron v. Seguin Indep. Sch. Dist., 974 F.
Supp. 2d 1020 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Kabacinski v. State of Del. Dep’t of Educ., 62
IDELR ¶ 133 (D. Del. 2013); Gaudino v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 61 IDELR ¶
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SOL generally, and specifically how SOL applies to the IDEA’s
impartial hearings. Parts II–IV addresses the elements of the SOL
statutory provisions in terms of the triggering date, the exceptions,
and the duration and effect of the SOL, including the importance of
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District Authority.14 Part V provides
practice pointers for IDEA IHOs.
I. SOL GENERALLY AND AS SPECIFICALLY APPLIED
TO IDEA IMPARTIAL HEARINGS
The SOL general nature and purposes, as Zirkel and Maher
observed, are:
“Statute of limitations” is a legislative expression of policy that
prohibits litigants from bringing claims after a period of time,
which destroys any right and remedy of the potential
claimant.15 It applies specifically to a particular action in law or
equity, whether civil or criminal. Its purposes are to 1) to
require that claims be advanced while the evidence to rebut
them is not stale, and 2) to penalize dilatoriness for the sake of
repose.16
As a result of the 2004 amendments, the IDEA contains two
provisions regarding the IHO-level SOL.17 In this context, SOL has
193 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Toledo, 948 F. Supp. 2d 793
(N.D. Ohio 2013); Brown v. Napa Valley Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 291 (N.D. Cal.
2012); J.W. v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 59 IDELR ¶ 246 (E.D.N.C. 2012);
Baker v. S. York Area Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 214 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
14
802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015). The overall focus here will be on the hearings
where the parents are the filing party, which is the typical posture. However, the
IDEA’s SOL provisions also apply to districts that file more than a negligible
proportion of IDEA impartial hearings. See, e.g., Cathy A. Skidmore & Perry A.
Zirkel, Has the Supreme Court’s Schaffer Decision Placed a Burden on Hearing
Officer Decision-Making under the IDEA, 35 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 304
(2015) (finding that districts filed eighteen percent of a sample of IDELRpublished IHO decisions from 1978 to 2013).
15
Zirkel & Maher, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Estate of Busch v. Ferrel-Duncan
Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985).
16
Zirkel & Maher, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Ochs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 447 A.2d
153 (N.J. 1982)).
17
See infra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text. The 2006 regulations merely
mirror the wording of these two SOL provisions without elaboration. 34 C.F.R §§
300.507(a)(2), 300.511(e) (2013).
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these same basic purposes as in civil law more generally.18 The first
provision, under the caption “timeline for requesting hearing” is:
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process
hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or
should have known about the alleged action that forms the
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time
limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter,
in such time as the State law allows.19
The second provision, under “types of procedures,” provides the
following specification for the request, referred to synonymously as
“the complaint”20:
sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2
years before the date the parent or public agency knew or
should have known about the alleged action that forms the
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time
limitation for presenting such a complaint under this
subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the
exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D)
shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph.21
The remaining parts of this article address the case law specific to
each of the features of this pair of provisions, including the
exceptions and the durational issues in the Third Circuit’s recent G.L.
decision.22 As a transitional threshold matter, the limited prevailing
view is that the SOL is an affirmative defense.23 Consequently, the
burden of persuasion is on the party asserting the defense,24 with the
18

See, e.g., Holden v. Miller-Smith, 28 F Supp. 3d 729, 735 (W.D. Mich.
2014) (“The two-year period [under the amended IDEA] permits plaintiffs to
exercise their rights . . . within a reasonable period of time, protects potential
defendants from a protracted fear of litigation, and promotes judicial efficiency by
preventing . . . courts from having to litigate stale claims.”).
19
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).
20
See, e.g., id. §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(b)(8), 1415(c)(2)(A), 1415(d)(1)(A).
21
Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B).
22
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015).
23
See, e.g., M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296, 304, 306
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 111 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
24
See, e.g., K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *16–17
(E.D.N.Y. 2014). For applying waiver at the impartial hearing level, see, e.g.,
Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 116 LRP 5716 (Pa. SEA Jan. 4, 2016) (“in the
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burden shifting to the party asserting exceptions to the SOL.25
Figure 1 provides a visual organizer for the next parts of the
article.

Figure 1. Framework for SOL at the IDEA’s IHO Stage

3

1

2

FAPE denial
starting date

KOSHK
date

filing
date

2 years* unless exception
4

remedy

?
________
* different period if specified in applicable state law

When the SOL is at issue, the primary and central step, which is
designated in Figure 1 as circled number 1, is the sometimes difficult
determination of the KOSHK date, also referred to herein at the
triggering date. Next is determining whether the claim is timely in
terms of the applicable period (i.e., two years unless specified
otherwise in state law or unless an exception applies) from the
KOSHK date to the easily ascertainable filing date, which is number
absence of guidance, I conclude that affirmative defenses must be raised sometime
before the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing").
25
See, e.g., Reg’l Sch. Unit 51 v. Doe, 920 F. Supp. 2d 168, 197 (D. Me.
2013); G.I. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 61 IDELR ¶ 298, at *9 (E.D. Tex.
2013); J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257, 268 (W.D. Pa.
2008).
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2 in the Figure. Next, if the filing is timely, the question arises as to
whether the period extends to a point earlier than the KOSHK date
based on the underlying action, designated above as number 3 - the
starting date for the claimed denial of FAPE. Finally, if the parent
ultimately proves the requisite denial of FAPE, the determination of
the equitable remedy (e.g., compensatory education or tuition
reimbursement) may be for a time period longer, shorter, or equal to
the deprivation of FAPE.26 The next two parts of the article address
the KOSHK date and the potentially asserted exceptions, whereas
Part IV addresses the resulting calculations for the duration of the
period for liability, including the effect in terms of the potentially
resulting remedy.
II. TRIGGERING DATE
It is not uncommon for IHOs to follow the lead of courts to apply
the IDEA SOL without specific discussion or analysis, as a “look
back” from the date of filing.27
However, as the first
aforementioned28 statutory provision makes clear, the triggering date
26

For the range of equitable remedies under the IDEA, see, e.g., Perry A.
Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011). For more detail on the primary two remedies, see, e.g.,
Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A Decisional
Checklist, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 785 (2012); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory
Education: An Annotated Update of the Law, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 501 (2010). For
the calculation of compensatory education that may yield periods not identical to
the duration of the FAPE denial, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Competing
Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC.
L. REP. 550 (2010). Moreover, to the recognized extent that the equities apply to
the determination of tuition reimbursement, the period for this remedy may be less
than that for the denial of FAPE. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C).
27
See, e.g., C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011); Davis v.
Hampton Pub. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 231 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d mem., 352 F.
App’x 780 (4th Cir. 2009); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, Marshall v. H.M.J. ex rel.
A.J., M.N., No. CIV. 14-2114 JRT/HB, 2015 WL 4744505 (D. Minn. Aug. 11,
2015); Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Pass
v. Rollinsford Sch. Dist., 928 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.H. 2013); Swope v. Cent. York
Sch. Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 32 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Littman v. Livingston Twp. Sch. Dist.,
55 IDELR ¶ 139 (D.N.J. 2010); cf. Hooker v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR ¶
166 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (parallel state law but for one-year period).
28
See supra text accompanying note 19.
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for the filing deadline is that upon which the parent “knew or had
reason to know,” which some courts have referred to as the “know or
should have known” (KOSHK) date.29 Moreover, the KOSHK is
specifically connected in the statute to the “alleged action that forms
the basis of the complaint.”30 In the cases to date, courts have
variously interpreted this connection.31 For example, taking a strict
approach, one federal district court in an unpublished decision
concluded that, based on the plain language of the statute, this
limitations period is “two years from the date that the parents knew
of the complained-of action, not two years from the date that the
parents knew the action taken was wrong.”32 Similarly, another
federal court clarified that the KOSHK is specific to the action, not
when it was actionable.33 Representing a more forgiving approach,
more than one other court, including the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, interpreted the KOSHK as not applying until the parents

29

See, e.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 604 n.2.
Id.
31
In some cases, the underlying action is clear-cut. See, e.g., Mittman v.
Livingston Twp. Bd. of Educ., 55 IDELR ¶ 139 (D.N.J. 2010) (identifying the
action as the IEP team’s exiting the child from special education). However,
defining the KOSHK date in tuition reimbursement cases in a similarly per se way
as the time of the unilateral placement, e.g., R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 57
IDELR ¶ 155, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing M.D. v. Southington Bd. of Educ., 334
F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003), which was based on Section 1983 accrual), is
imprecise because 1) it is not necessarily identical to the underlying action, and 2)
the date of the unilateral placement arguably could be the date of deposit, the date
of the end of the school year, or the first day of attendance at the private school).
32
Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 50 IDELR ¶ 285, at *15
(D.N.M. 2010). Although the IDEA SOL applies equally to the school district, in
this case the parents were the filing party. Moreover, in this case the action was the
district’s individualized education program (IEP) classification of the child,
whereas it was not until much later that the parents knew or had reason to know
that this action was allegedly a misclassification. Based on undisputed evidence
that the parents know of the child’s classification upon the development of the first
IEP, the court concluded that the period began to run at that earlier date, thus
expiring before the filing of their hearing request. The court alternatively used the
term “accrue” for the start of the period. Id. at *17.
33
J.P. v. Enid Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 112, at *5 (W.D. Okla. 2009)
(concluding that the triggering date is “when the parent ‘knew or should have
known about the alleged action that form the basis of the complaint,’ and not when
the parent becomes aware that the school district’s actions are actionable”).
30
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have the necessary facts of the alleged violation. 34 Finally, using
language that originated with section 1983 federal civil rights
claims,35 various other courts reached mixed results based on the
more ambiguous translation of the target KOSHK event as the
“injury.”36
The determination of the KOSHK date is critical but problematic
regardless of the semantic formulation of the underlying action. A
Pennsylvania case serves as an example.37 The student, who had a
lifelong gastrointestinal condition that caused cyclic vomiting,
experienced continuing difficulties in school starting in kindergarten
based in part on health-related attendance issues.38 His parents
withdrew him for parochial schooling in grades one through four and,
after hospitalization, again in grades seven through nine.39 The
parents filed for an impartial hearing on January 23, 2009, in the
middle of grade twelve.40 The IHO used a look back period to
eliminate the period before the middle of grade ten.41 For the

34

See, e.g., Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008);
K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Gwinnett Cnty.
Sch. Dist. v. A.A., 54 IDELR ¶ 316 (N.D. Ga. 2010). The K.H. court similarly
referred to the start of this period as “claim accrual.” K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 63 IDELR at *14.
35
See, e.g., Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Under
federal law a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff learns of the injury
which is the basis of his action.”). The bridge in the New York cases was M.D. v.
Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003).
36
See, e.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 607, 611;
Lauren G. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D. Pa. 2012);
R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 57 IDELR ¶ 155 (S.D.N.Y 2011); C.B. v.
Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 54 IDELR ¶ 149 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). All of these cases
refer to the triggering of the SOL in terms of accrual. Lauren G. v. W. Chester
Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d at 386; R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 57
IDELR at *4; C.B. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 54 IDELR at *16; see also Somoza
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (bridging the pre
IDEA 2004 and the IDEA 2004 SOL).
37
Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 58 IDELR ¶ 45 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
38
Id. at *2.
39
Id. at *2–3.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *2. The IHO in this case did some mental manipulations before
ultimately arriving at a look back period. More specifically, first finding the
KOSHK to be in 2001, the IHO reasoned that every day of alleged denial of FAPE
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remaining two-year period, the IHO ruled in the parent’s favor,
concluding that the district should have identified the student as
eligible under the IDEA and provided him with the required free
appropriate public education (FAPE).42 Upon both parties’ appeal,
the court cited the aforementioned43 Oklahoma case for the KOSHK
reference point, which in this case was “[the district’s failure] to
respond sufficiently and effectively to concerns expressed by parents
about a child's functioning in school.”44 The parents contended that
they did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged
denial of services until 2008.45 The district argued that the KOSHK
date was far earlier because they would have known of their right to
request an evaluation by either checking the annual notice of IDEA
rights that the district published in the local newspaper and included
on the parent calendars or consulting an attorney.46 However,
apparently viewing the complaint as including a child find claim,47
the court reasoned that “a reasonable inference from the evidence is
that the District's failure to provide [the] parents with a ‘permission
to evaluate form’ . . . could have led them to believe that: (1) [the
student] had no rights under the IDEA; or (2) a request for an
evaluation or a meeting with an attorney would be fruitless.”48 As a
result, the court concluded that the KOSHK date was “at least at the
end of 2006–2007,” thus making their complaint timely.49 However,
although not entirely clear, the effect of this determination in this
case appears to have been to merely confirm the two-year denial of
was a separate action, thus ultimately concluding that "every date up to January 23,
2007, two years back from the date Parents filed the instant complaint on January
23, 2009, is untimely.” Id.
42
Id.
43
See J.P. v. Enid Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 112 (W.D. Okla. 2009)
44
Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 58 IDELR ¶ 45 *5 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
45
Id.
46
Id. at. *6.
47
For the reasonable suspicion and reasonable period requirements of child
find; see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, “Child Find”: The Lore v. the Law, 307 EDUC. L.
REP. 574 (2014).
48
Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 58 IDELR at *6.
49
Id. at *7. It may be argued that the court’s reasoning contradicted its recited
standard, because the parent knew of the alleged failure much earlier but did not
realize that this action (or in this case, inaction) was actionable until the designated
time (or at the time they finally did consult an attorney and file for a hearing).
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FAPE, whereas an alternative interpretation would be to extend the
remedy back to whenever the district had reason to evaluate the
student as eligible.50
It is likely that school districts and parents will separately try to
document or otherwise solidify proof of the triggering date and action
that favors their position. Such evidence will include not only the
documented history of the case but also the testimony at the hearing.
For example, in a recent New Hampshire case, the guardian’s
testimony was the key in determining the SOL for her challenge to
the IEPs for grades nine, ten, and eleven.51 Specifically, the guardian
testified on direct examination that when she signed the IEP for grade
nine, she did so to confirm her participation, but not to agree with the
contents because she “felt that [the student] needed more.”52 The
court concluded that this testimony preponderantly proved that she
discovered the district’s alleged violation on the date of signing the
IEP, “thus triggering the running of the limitations period.”53
Because she did not request a hearing until two and a half years later,
she was time-barred from challenging the ninth grade IEP but not the
two subsequent IEPs.54 Similarly, evidence of whether and when the
district provided the parents with the procedural safeguards notice
may be critical as to the triggering date.55

50

Oddly straddling the fence between child find and FAPE, the court declined
to rule on whether the student was eligible for services under the IDEA. Id. at *8
n.12.
51
Pass v. Rollinsford Sch. Dist., 928 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.H. 2013).
52
Id. at 364.
53
Id. The court accorded weight to the guardian’s contention that “a parent or
guardian who lacks expertise in the field of special education may not recognize an
IEP’s deficient design until the IEP is implemented and problems begin to
emerge,” but concluded that her testimony that she immediately appreciated the
IEPs defects as even weightier. Id. at 365 n.8. For another such determination, see
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1123 (N.D. Ala.
2013), aff’d on other grounds, 581 F. App’x 760 (11th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that
the parent, who was “not a novice to the special education system, having other
children who were involved in special education,” had reason to know of her child
find claim when she received the students failing grades).
54
928 F. Supp. 2d 349 at 364.
55
See, e.g., Marc V. v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591 (W.D.
Tex. 2006) (upholding the IHO’s determination that the KOSHK date was when
the parents’ received the procedural safeguards notice).
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III. EXCEPTIONS
The IDEA specifies two exceptions. Additionally, parties
seeking to avoid being time-barred have asserted the alternative
theories of equitable tolling, minority tolling, and continuing
violations.56
A. Specified Exceptions
1. Misrepresentation.
The first of the IDEA’s two explicit exceptions concerns
misrepresentation, specifically providing that the SOL shall not apply
under the following circumstances: “if the parent was prevented from
requesting the hearing due to—(i) specific misrepresentations by the
local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the
basis of the complaint.”57 This language includes not only specific
misrepresentations but also a causal connection (via “prevented”) and
a limiting predicate (i.e., resolving the underlying action).58
The leading case thus far is the Third Circuit’s published decision
For the “specific
in D.K. v. Abington School District.59
misrepresentation” element, the court agreed with most of the district
courts in the circuit60 that intent, not merely negligence, was
required. Thus, the Third Circuit ruled that to qualify for this
exception “plaintiffs must show that the school intentionally misled
them or knowingly deceived them regarding their child’s progress.”61
Applying this exception, the D.K. court concluded that the various
conferences and other communications with the parents fell “well

56

See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (2012).
58
Id.
59
696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012).
60
Id. at 245 (citing I.H. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762
(M.D. Pa. 2012); Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 157
(E.D. Pa. 2008)). The court did not cite two other prior pertinent lower court
rulings: Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Deborah A., 52 IDELR ¶ 67 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
24, 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 422 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the
narrow interpretation); J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (adopting a broader view).
61
D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 246.
57
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short” of not only the intentional or knowing requirement, but also
the problem-resolution requirement.62 Thus, the D.L. court did not
the aforementioned63 third essential element—causation.
The causation element was the undoing of the parents’ assertion
of this exception in a pre-D.K. district court decision in Indiana.64 In
this case, the court expressed doubt but did not definitively decide
whether the alleged testing information violations constituted
misrepresentation, concluding that the parents failed to show how
this asserted misrepresentation prevented the parents from requesting
a hearing within the prescribed period.65 Similarly, the causation
requirement led to the failure to qualify for this exception in a postD.K. decision in Pennsylvania.66
Conversely, the intent requirement was fatal for parents in
various lower court decisions post-D.K. First, in two successive
decisions within the Third Circuit, federal district courts ruled that
the parents failed to prove the requisite intentional or knowing
misrepresentation.67 Second, the federal district court in Maine
62

Id. at 247.
See supra text accompanying note 58.
64
Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.
Ind. 2011).
65
Id. at 643-44.
66
Shadie v. Forte, 61 IDELR ¶ 40, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom Shadie v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 580 F. App’x 67 (3d Cir.
2014). For a post-D.K. claim that, prior to these other elements, failed at the
threshold because the only misrepresentation was by the state education agency,
not the defendant school district, see Jenkins v. Butts Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CIV
5:15-CV-30 (MTT), 2016 WL 740461 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2016) (“[the parent] has
presented no evidence that the Defendant made a misrepresentation that prevented
her from requesting a due process hearing”).
67
Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 543, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2013),
aff’d on other grounds, 581 F. App’x 141 (3d Cir. 2014); W.H. v. Schuykill Valley
Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 315 (E.D. Pa. 2013). In Coleman, the court rejected the
parents’ contention that D.K. extended the standard to egregious misstatements or
willful indifference, concluding that this argument was unconvincing and, in any
event, lacking in preponderant proof in this case. Id. at 569 n.57. The effect of the
Coleman court’s ruling was to uphold the IHO’s look-back time bar against the
claims beyond the two-year period prior to filing. Id. at 569. In W.H., the court
relied on the lower court decisions that foreshadowed D.K. (supra note 60),
although the effect was less clear in terms of the application of the two-year period.
W.H. v. Schuykill Valley Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d at 318, 324 (exclusion of
2008–2009, which was largely beyond the two-year look-back period).
63
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followed D.K. to require intentionality, which the parents failed to
prove.68 Third, a federal district court decision in Texas, which has a
one-year limitations period69 per the IDEA express allowance,70
followed a pre-D.K. decision in Texas to apply and find unproven a
similarly strict, although not precisely stated, standard.71
In the only available decision thus far where the parents
succeeded in their assertion of the misrepresentation exception, a
federal district court concluded that the district’s knowing
misstatement to the parents about its evaluation obligation interfered
with the parents’ filing the complaint.72 However, this court’s
application of the exception confirmed rather than contradicted the
conclusion that its scope is relatively narrow.
2. Information-Withholding.
The second of the two exceptions concerns informationwithholding, specifically providing that the SOL does not apply
under the following circumstances: “if the parent was prevented from
requesting the hearing due to . . . (ii) the local educational agency's
withholding of information from the parent that was required under

68

Ms. S. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 72, 64 IDELR ¶ 202 (D. Me. 2014), adopted, 65
IDELR ¶ 140 (D. Me. 2015).
69
19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1151(c) (2013).
70
See supra text accompanying notes 19, 21.
71
Z.H. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 106 (E.D. Tex. 2015),
adopted, 65 IDELR ¶ 147 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (ruling that mere disagreements about
the child’s evaluation were insufficient and noting that the KOSHK date was
unproven) (citing C.H. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 815 F. Supp. 2d 977 (E.D. Tex.
2011)) (ruling that the alleged misrepresentations either were not before the
prescribed SOL period or were not at the requisite level of bad faith or not proven).
72
Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
For the knowing element, the court reasoned as follows: “The [d]istrict knew or
had reason to know that its statement . . . was erroneous given the fact that it had
previously litigated and lost the same argument.” Id. at 789. For the causation, or
interference, element, the court deferred to the IHO’s credibility-based findings.
Id. However, a subsequent decision in Maine interpreted this decision more
narrowly, concluding that “[i]n Ravenswood, no question was raised as to whether
the school district's misrepresentations to the parent were intentional.” Ms. S. v.
Reg’l Sch. Unit 72, 64 IDELR ¶ 202, at *10 (D. Me. 2014), adopted, 65 IDELR ¶
140 (D. Me. 2015).
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this [IDEA] subchapter to be provided to the parent.”73 Again, as the
leading decision, the Third Circuit in D.K. interpreted this exception
narrowly, concluding that parents could satisfy it 1) “only by
showing that the school failed to provide them with a written notice,
explanation or form specifically required by the IDEA statutes and
regulations,”74 and 2) this withholding “caused [the parents’] failure
to request a hearing . . . on time.”75 Applying this exception, the
court concluded that 1) the documents that the parents identified as
not having received—the procedural safeguards notice and
permission to evaluate form—were not required under the
circumstances of their child, and 2) even if they had been required,
the parents had failed to show the requisite causation.76
The causation requirement was also fatal to the parents’
information-withholding exception claim in a subsequent Ninth
Circuit decision.77 In this case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
district failed to provide the parents with certain required student
progress data, but this violation did not establish the asserted
exception because “[t]he parents fail[ed] to demonstrate how receipt
of [this] data, and for that matter the [allegedly belated] notice of
procedural safeguards . . . would have caused them to file the due
process complaint earlier.”78 In a Pennsylvania case, the court
concluded that the parents failed to prove both the requisite causation

73

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (2012).
D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2012).
75
Id. The court derived this “causation requirement” from the “prevented”
language that is the lead-in for both exceptions. Id.
76
Id. at 247–48.
77
M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Shadie
v. Forte, 61 IDELR ¶ 40, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d on other grounds sub nom
Shadie v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 580 F. App’x 67 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing the
“‘high threshold’” that D.K. established).
78
M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d at 859. For the assuming arguendo
reference to the procedural safeguards notice, the court upheld the IHO’s credibility
finding, because it met the requisite “careful and thorough” standard for judicial
deference, that the district had provided this required notice on a timely basis. Id.
The effect in this case was to uphold the IHO’s otherwise unchallenged “look
back” bar of any claims more than two years before the date of filing the complaint.
Id.
74
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and the required withheld information.79 Moreover, focusing on the
information element, a lengthening line of court decisions has limited
this second exception to the procedural safeguards requirements of
the IDEA, which none of these plaintiff-parents fulfilled.80
In contrast, relatively few parents have hurdled the prevailing
standards for the information withholding exception. First, in an
Alaska case, the federal district court duly deferred to the IHO’s
decision that the parent qualified for this exception “under the unique
facts of this case.”81 The district provided a notice of procedural
safeguards that suggested a three-year period rather than the one-year
SOL that is applicable under Alaska law, which appeared to be the
key factual finding.82 Second, in the aforementioned case that
primarily relied on the misrepresentation exception,83 the court
additionally and briefly ruled that the failure to provide the parents
with the procedural safeguards notice triggered the informationwithholding exception.84 Third, in the strongest decision in the
79

W.H. v. Schuykill Valley Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (E.D. Pa.
2013)); cf. G.W. v. Rye City Dep’t of Educ., 61 IDELR ¶ 14 (S.D.N.Y 2013)
(unproven withholding of information).
80
See, e.g., Z.H. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 106, at *8–9
(E.D. Tex. 2015), adopted, 65 IDELR ¶ 147 (E.D. Tex. 2015); Avila v. Spokane
Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 171, at *8–9 (E.D. Wash. 2014); G.I. v. Lewisville Indep.
Sch. Dist., 61 IDELR ¶ 298, at *10 (E.D. Tex. 2013); Swope v. Cent. York Sch.
Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 32 (M.D. Pa. 2012); C.H. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 815 F. Supp.
2d 977, 986 (E.D. Tex. 2011); Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 805
F. Supp. 2d 630, 644–45 (S.D. Ind. 2011); Hooker v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 56
IDELR ¶ 232, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2011); Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Deborah A., 52
IDELR ¶ 67, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2009); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 567 F.
Supp. 2d 918, 944–45 (W.D. Tex. 2008); D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F.
Supp. 2d 484, 492 (D.N.J. 2008); cf. Moyer v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 60
IDELR ¶ 126, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Baker v. S. York Area Sch. Dist., 53
IDELR ¶ 214 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (limiting the procedural safeguards failure to the
relevant period). The effect of most of these rulings was to apply an otherwise
unchallenged “look-back” bar of any claims more than two-years before the date of
filing the complaint. For an exception to this line of decisions, see infra note 86
and accompanying text.
81
Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. D.Y., 54 IDELR ¶ 52, at *3 (D.
Alaska 2010).
82
Id. For the Alaska law, see ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (West 2014).
83
See supra text accompanying note 57.
84
Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780, 789 (N.D. Cal.
2012). The cursory analysis did not address the causation element. Id.
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parents’ favor, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district’s failure to
include the required members of the IEP team that caused the parents
not to file on time fulfilled the information-withholding exception.85
Finally, a federal district court in Maine concluded that the failure to
provide the parents with the procedural safeguards notice at the
relevant time, regardless of the district’s good faith and any previous
such notice, fulfilled the plaintiff’s information and causation
requisites of this exception.86
The only other examples were for more limited success. In an
Idaho case, the court dismissed the case without prejudice based on
the parents’ failure to exhaust the impartial hearing provision of the
IDEA. In doing so, the court provided nonbinding but rather strongly
worded guidance that the withholding exception should apply
because the district failed to provide the procedural safeguards notice
upon a change in the student’s placement.87 Somewhat similarly, in a
Georgia case, the court concluded that the parents pled sufficient
facts to survive the motion to dismiss her claim of this exception,88
but in line with its warning that the subsequently developed record
could yield a different outcome89 and after remand to the IHO, the
court upheld the exception’s applicability in this case.90 In any event,
all of these cases confirmed rather than contradicted the prevailing
and relatively narrow interpretation of the scope of information under

85

S.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 864 (5th Cir. 2012). But
cf. Reyes v. Manor Indep. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 33, at *5–6 (W.D. Tex. 2016)
(following S.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist. based on broader information
interpretation but ultimately distinguishing it based on causation factor).
86
Reg’l Sch. Unit 51 v. Doe, 920 F. Supp. 2d 168, 197–203 (D. Me. 2013).
87
Kelly O. v. Taylor Crossing Pub. Charter Sch., 61 IDELR ¶ 295, at *10 (D.
Idaho 2013) (“because the school failed to provide [the] parents with notice on how
to present such claims, they should not now be time barred from doing so. . . .
[The] district may not be out of the ‘deep doo doo’ just yet.”).
88
Jenkins v. Butts Cnty. Sch. Dist., 984 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (M.D. Ga.
2013) (basing this conclusion on the district’s alleged failure to provide the
required prior written notice and procedural safeguards notice).
89
Id. at 1379 n.15.
90
Jenkins v. Butts Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 5:15-CV-30 (MTT), 2016 WL
740461 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2016) (“there is no evidence [the parent] lacked the
necessary information to determine whether her daughter had been injured by the
Defendant's actions”).
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this exception.91
B. Other Asserted Exceptions.
Parents have attempted to import other exceptions beyond the
two explicit IDEA SOL exceptions. However, in light of Congress’s
choice to limit the express exceptions to this tandem pair,92 the
legislative history,93 and the administrative agency interpretation,94
the prevailing judicial view is that the common law doctrines of
equitable tolling95 and minority tolling96 do not apply. Similarly, for
the same reasons,97 the weight of judicial authority thus far has rather
clearly favored the inapplicability of the continuing violations theory

91

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing the canon of construction of exclusio unis).
93
See, e.g., id. (citing S. REP. 108-85, at 40 (2003)).
94
See, e.g., id. (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,697 (Aug. 14, 2006)).
95
See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 248; Holden v. MillerSmith, 28 F. Supp. 3d 729, 735–36 (W.D. Mich. 2014); D.C. v. Klein Indep. Sch.
Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 739, 746–47 (S.D. Tex. 2010); cf. Breanne v. S. York Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (denying its applicability
at least “under the circumstances present here”); L.P. v. Longmeadow Pub. Sch., 59
IDELR ¶ 169, at *11 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding it inapplicable in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances). The effect of most of these decisions, including
D.K., was to apply an otherwise unchallenged “look-back” bar of any claims more
than two-years before the date of filing the complaint.
96
See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 248; Reyes v. Manor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 33, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2016); Baker v. S. York Area
Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 214, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2009); cf. Breanne v. S. York Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (denying its applicability at
least in the factual circumstances of this case); Piazza v. Florida Union Free Sch.
Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 669, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting this doctrine for preIDEA 2004 claims, while noting split in judicial authority during that silent
period). But cf. Michelle K. v. Pentucket Reg’l Sch. Dist., 79 F. Supp. 3d 361,
372–73 (D. Mass. 2015) (applying to claims filed by now-adult student and
seemingly tangential to exhaustion ruling). For a comprehensive analysis of the
IDEA that supports the non-applicability of minority tolling, see Lynn Daggett,
LeeAnn Gurysh & Perry A. Zirkel, For Whom the School Bell Tolls But Not the
Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717 (2005).
97
See, e.g., J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257, 268–69
(W.D. Pa. 2008).
92
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in IDEA SOL cases.98
IV. DURATION AND EFFECT
The duration of the SOL for the impartial hearing under IDEA
2004 is clearly two years, except for the few states that have adopted
a different period,99 as the pertinent provision expressly permits.100
The first problem is that, contrary to typical practice of a look-back
application from the date of the hearing request,101 the period counts
forward from the KOSHK date.102 The second problem is the issue

98

See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 248; E.F. v. Newport
Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 265, at *12 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Jefferson
Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1124 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff’d
on other grounds, 581 F. App’x 760 (11th Cir. 2014); Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of
Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 50 IDELR ¶ 285, at *14–16 (D.N.M. 2010). But cf. Jana
K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp. 3d 584, 598–600 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(applying purportedly distinguishable use of continuing violations to fill out the
2+2 analysis in a child find case); K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295,
at *17–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying similarly confusing accrual analysis to find
FAPE claim not time barred for at least 14 years). The effect of most of these
decisions, including D.K., was to apply an otherwise unchallenged “look-back” bar
of any claims more than two-years before the date of filing the complaint. See also
D.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 78 (D.N.J. 2014).
99
A leading example is the Texas law, which specifies a period of one year
from the KOSHK date. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. A variation is
Alaska’s one-year period from “the date that the school district provides the parent
with written notice of the decision with which the parent disagrees.” See supra
note 82. As an example in the opposite direction, Kentucky provides for a period
of three years from the KOSHK. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.224(6) (West 2013).
In contrast, most states that specified a different period have revised their laws to
conform to the IDEA’s 2004 amendments. See, e.g., Ms. S. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 72,
64 IDELR ¶ 202, at *6-9 (D. Me. 2014) (citing ME. CODE R. 07-071, ch. 101, §
XVI.13.E–F, which changed the limitations period from four to two years); K.H. v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 4401(1)(a) (2013), which changed limitations period from one to two
years). As a variation, Hawaii changed from 90 days to the two-year IDEA
limitations period with an exception: hearing requests for tuition reimbursement
have a 180-day period. K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., 665
F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011); Teresa L. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 325 F. App’x
583, 584 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-443(a) (2011)).
100
See supra text accompanying note 19.
101
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
102
See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.
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of whether the tandem provision in the IDEA103 establishes a twoyear limit in the opposite direction from the KOSHK date or, if not,
what the limit in the past is for the scope of the hearing?104
In a recent published decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the so-called “2+2” ruling of the lower court, which, along
with a few other district courts in Pennsylvania,105 interpreted the
plain language of the pair of SOL provisions in IDEA 2004 as
extending not only up to two years forward, but also up to two years
back, from the KOSHK date.106 Instead, based on the statutory text,
legislative history, and agency interpretation, the Third Circuit
concluded that the two provisions refer, although “inartful[ly],”107 to
the same two-year filing deadline for a due process complaint after
the KOSHK date.108 Thus, the court resolved the first issue by
reemphasizing that the two-year filing deadline is forward from the
KOSHK date, not either forward from the date of injury or a look
back from the date of filing.109 Moreover, the Third Circuit similarly
cited D.K. to make clear that “parental vigilance is vital” to this filing
deadline, suggesting a relatively strict approach to the prescribed
period and sole exceptions.110
Even more significantly, contrary to the two-year limitation on
103

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
As a way of avoiding both problems, a federal court in Texas effectively
arrived at the same result as the look-back approach by reasoning that, in the
absence of applicable exceptions, “any claims for acts and omissions Plaintiff knew
or should have known about prior to [the date one year before the filing date] are
time-barred.” T.C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 4:13cv186, 2016 WL
705930 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2016).
105
See, e.g., Jana K. ex rel. Tim K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp.
3d 584 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Morgan M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 309
(E.D. Pa. 2015).
106
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 614-15 (3d Cir.
2015).
107
Id at 605; see also id. at 625 (“the inconsistent language reflects nothing
more than a drafting error in [Congress’s] reconciliation process”).
108
Id. at 616–25.
109
Id. at 625 (citing D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. 696 F.3d 233, 248, 254 (3d
Cir. 2012).
110
Id. For example, the court warned that “parents may not, without satisfying
one of the two statutory exceptions, knowingly sit on their rights or attempt to
sweep both timely and expired claims into a single ‘continuing violation’ claim
brought years later.” Id.
104
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the other side of the KOSHK date in the “2+2” approach, the Third
Circuit adopted a rather open-ended interpretation of the
retrospective remedial scope of a timely filed complaint.111 In
contrast to the common although not universal practice of various
IHOs and courts of applying the filing period on a look-back basis as
the scope of the claim,112 the Third Circuit ruled—based on its preIDEA 2004 compensatory education standard113 and the IDEA
2004’s legislative history114— that the limitations period “is not a cap
111

Id. at 625–26. The G.L court made clear its analysis consisted of two
successive parts by characterizing the “upshot” of its analysis as “two-fold” and by
stating its concluding holding in as a tandem, flowchart-like sequence. Id. at 625.
112
Illustrations of this application are available in the cases identified supra
note 27. Providing further reinforcement of this application are the rather
consistent line of cases that allocate to the IHO’s discretion the admission of
evidence for the time before the filing period but only for background, not liability.
See, e.g., Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., No. 15-10123, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18911 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2015); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413 v. H.M.J.
ex rel. A.J., M.N., No. CIV. 14-2114 JRT/HB, 2015 WL 4744505 (D. Minn. 2015);
Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw. v. E.B., 45 IDELR ¶ 249, at *5 (D. Haw. 2006). The
limited exception for this interpretation is for the calculation of compensatory
education in jurisdictions that use the qualitative approach and only in cases where
the amount “reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely
would have accrued from special education services the school district should have
supplied in the first place” exceeds the hour-for-hour duration of the denial of
FAPE within the applicable period. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524
(D.C. Cir. 2005). For an example of such a situation, see Cent. Sch. Dist. v. K.C.,
61 IDELR ¶ 125, at *11 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
113
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 618–19 (citing M.C.
ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996)).
However, this standard was based on the district’s, not the parent’s KOSHK date,
and it introduced the inconsistently interpreted concept of “accrual.” For tuition
reimbursement cases, the issue of the scope of liability is often not acute.
However, it is not entirely free from disputes. See supra note 31. Moreover, in
some tuition reimbursement cases, the parent may be additionally seeking
compensatory education for the period prior to the unilateral placement.
114
Id. at 624 (citing 150 Cong. Rec. S11851 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin)). With regard to the legislative history, the court
also cited Valverde, supra note 12, at 643–46. Interestingly, although Valverde,
who is a clinical professor serving primarily low-income clients, advanced this
view of the legislative history, her ultimate recommendation was for Congress to
amend the IDEA’s remedial scheme to codify compensatory education on a
broadened basis to rectify this economic inequity and make this intent clear. Id. at
668. Both the court and Valverde also cited Robert R. v. Marple Newtown School
District, 44 IDELR ¶ 186 (E.D. Pa. 2005), but this case was based on the pre-IDEA
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on a child’s remedy for timely-filed claims that happen to date back
more than two years before the complaint is filed.”115 And, as the
counter-weight for the strict-on-parent approach for the filing
period,116 the court extracted from its past decisions a strict-ondistrict application for this remedial period.117
But how far back does this pre-KOSHK date period go? By
focusing on the remedy, or “the redress available for timely-filed
claims,”118 the Third Circuit left the answer open to interpretation.119
For example, in one part of the opinion the court appeared to extend
the remedial boundary to “claims not yet reasonably knowable,”120
yet in another part the court appeared to reaffirm its early and
repeated standard for compensatory education that the boundary is
“the point that the school district ‘knows or should know of the injury
to the child.”121 The rubbery and not clearly defined elasticity of the
remedial period is further evident in the court’s citation of its prior
compensatory education rulings,122 including the potential eight-year
SOL and only cited the IDEA 2004 legislative history as indirect support for its
interpretation of the prior Third Circuit decisions.
115
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 616. In contrast, the
common practice (supra note 27) provides a clear cut-off that, with the limited
exception for the qualitative calculation of compensatory education, yields a period
that may well be longer than the Third Circuit’s answer to the triggering issue of
G.L., but may well be shorter than the Third Circuit’s answer for G.L.’s remedial
issue.
116
See supra text accompanying note 110.
117
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 625-26 (citing M.C. v.
Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996)).
118
Id. at 612.
119
For an alternate open ended approach, see, e.g., K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding KOSHK triggered claims
spanning entire 14-year period of eligibility).
120
Id. at 617. For further dicta in the opinion that suggested an open-ended
approach, see id. at 620 (“any claim for [a] violation, however far back it dates.”)
and id. at 618 (citing a previous Third Circuit case, that “‘nothing in the text or
history suggest[s] that relief under IDEA is limited in any way . . . .’” Id. (emphasis
added)).
121
Id. at 618 (citing, e.g., D.F. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d at 499; M.C. v.
Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396–97 (3d Cir. 1996)). As observed supra
note 113, this formulation amounts to an earlier, different KOSHK.
122
Id. at 620. Moreover, by citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision and standard in
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit
reinforced the present ambiguity as to whether it has replaced the quantitative with
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period in Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E.123 Moreover, the
facts in G.L. are not particularly helpful because the KOSHK date
and timeliness of the filing were effectively beyond dispute124 and the
student’s enrollment started for a relatively limited period before the
KOSHK date.125
For this “elephant” in G.L.’s SOL room,126 the arguably
appropriate approach is to define the back-side boundary as the
reasonably determined start of the alleged violation.
More
specifically, based on the statutory specification of “the alleged
action that forms the basis of the complaint”127 and the G.L.

the qualitative approach for calculating compensatory education. For an overview
of these two approaches, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Competing
Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC.
L. REP. 550 (2010). For an earlier Third Circuit example of this ambiguity, see
Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010). For a
discussion of the seeming transition, see Jana K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39
F. Supp. 3d 584, 606–08 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
123
172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).
124
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 2015).
125
After spending the previous year in parochial school, the student reenrolled
in the district in September 2008, and the KOSHK date was March 9, 2010, which
was when the parents withdrew the student from the district and enrolled him in a
cyber charter school. Id. at 605–06. Soon after September 2008, the student’s
parent requested an evaluation, which is the earliest point to which they could
stretch their child find claim, as reflected in their claim for denial of FAPE. Id. at
606. The IHO, following prevailing practice, limited the FAPE and, thus, remedial
analysis, to the two-year window before the January 9, 2012 filing date, thereby
excluding the 2008-2009 school year and the first half of the 2009-10 school year.
Id. at 607. Although the IHO ruled that the district had not denied FAPE for the
three months within the window that he was enrolled in the district, the effect of
G.L. on remand is to open up the window for the requested compensatory
education to an inexactly defined period that is limited, again by enrollment
considerations, to an outermost possible boundary of September 2008. Although
the applicable window, if the case does not end in settlement, likely extends to this
September start based on the alleged child find injury and the relatively limited
period, the precise point that G.L. intends for other cases is a relatively open
question.
126
Id. at 617 (reiterating the judicial expression about not hiding “‘elephants in
mouseholes’”) (citing E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct.
1584, 1612 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In comparison, G.L.’s resolution of the
first, triggering issue is a relative mousehole.
127
See supra text accompanying notes 19, 21.
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opinion’s repeated reference to “the injury,”128 including its
“practical example” of a three-year child find claim reasonably
discovered by the parents at the end of the third year,129 IHOs and
courts need to look first at the language of the complaint130 and
ultimately decide the alleged action that they knew or should have
known. This second determination may be at least as significant as
determining the KOSHK date.131 This action date serves as the
boundary for not only the basis of the FAPE-denial remedy132 but
also, except for discretionary background information,133 the scope of
admissible evidence.
A more definitive identification of the outer boundary, or the date
of KOSHK “action,” awaits further litigation in not only the Third
Circuit, which has been the locus of most of the case law to date,134
but also courts in other jurisdictions, which did not automatically or
universally adopt its corresponding initiative for compensatory

128

E.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 604–05, 607, and

611.
129

Id. at 613–14. Seemingly synonymous, the court also referred to this action
more than once as the “violation.” Id. at 614–15 and 621.
130
The IDEA requires that the complaint state “the nature of the problem of
the child relating to [the] proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to
such problem” and, “to the extent known and available to the party at the time,” its
proposed resolution. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(III–(IV)).
131
On an overlapping or alternative basis, this determination amounts to a
revisiting of the more complete analysis of the KOSHK triggering date. See supra
text accompanying note 30. Indeed, it may be seen as integral to the KOSHK date
resolution, showing the importance of determining the alleged action, because it
serves as the starting point to determine 1) when the parent knew or should have
known about it and, thus, whether the filing was timely, and 2) if timely, the period
for the evidentiary basis for the remedy.
132
Moving back from the focus on the action, which in compensatory education
cases is the denial of FAPE, the aforementioned limited exception of the qualitative
approach (supra note 112) applies to the remedy, which is the focus in G.L.
133
Id.
134
Another reason that IHOs and courts in the Third Circuit are likely to face
this issue imminently is that two of the three states in the region, Pennsylvania and
New Jersey rank fifth and sixth in IHO decisions and second and sixth in court
decisions under the IDEA. Zirkel, supra note 4, at 10; Bailey & Zirkel, supra note
4, at 7.
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education.135 Moreover, the IDEA’s administering agency, the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs
(OSEP) may provide guidance.136
Meanwhile, in the Third Circuit and in those jurisdictions that
follow its lead, the filing party will be very careful in its drafting of
the complaint to define not only the alleged KOSHK date but also the
scope of the underlying action’s scope so as to maximize the odds in
favor of both the timeliness of the request and the extent of the
remedy. The resolution of these issues is high stakes for the parties
in terms of liability and for IHOs in terms of the chronological scope
of the evidence within the already taxed forty-five day limit for the
decision.137 It is also predicable that these twin SOL issues will be
particularly problematic in cases that include child find claims for
compensatory education relief.138 Finally, for the second of these
135

The Second Circuit does not share the Third Circuit’s position on the
requisite denial of FAPE, at least for plaintiff-students beyond age twenty-one.
See, e.g., P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 512 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d
on other grounds, 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Garro v. Dep’t of Educ., 23
F.3d 734 (2d Cir. 1994)); cf. V.M. v. N. Colonie Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 102
(N.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990)); J.A. v.
E. Ramapo Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (also citing Mrs. C. v.
Wheaton). Moreover, the Third Circuit’s original approach to the calculation of
compensatory education is now the minority view. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of
Fayette Cnty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 2007); Reid v. Dist. of
Columbia, 401 F.2d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Perry A. Zirkel,
Compensatory Education: An Annotated Update of the Law, 291 EDUC. L. REP. 1,
6 n.49 (2013) (citing more recent cases).
136
Letter to Zirkel, 66 IDELR ¶ 288 (OSEP 2015):
The [G.L.] Court also held that neither provision limits remedies to injuries
that occurred within two years before the KOSHK date, and that, if parents
timely file a complaint and liability is proven, the entire period of the
violation should be remedied. In light of the Court's decision, the
Department is continuing to deliberate to determine whether further
guidance is necessary.
137
300 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2013). Approximately half of all adjudicated
hearings do not meet the forty-five day deadline without extensions, with
particularly high proportions in the active states of California (93%), Pennsylvania
(81%), and New York (77%). U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
SPECIAL EDUCATION: IMPROVED PERFORMANCE MEASURES COULD ENHANCE
OVERSIGHT
OF
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
24–25
(Aug.
2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665434.pdf
138
It is not happenstance that G.L., the practical example it offered, and the
several of the decisions that it cited, including Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230
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two issues, one cannot help but wonder how the Third Circuit’s
ruling squares with the primary purposes of a SOL.139
V. PRACTICE POINTERS FOR IHOS
Given the diversity of IHO systems140 under the IDEA structure
of “cooperative federalism,”141 the following set of practice
recommendations warrants careful customization depending on the
jurisdiction and discretion of the IHO.
First, using the previous parts of this article as a starting point,
become familiar with the variation, if any, of the two-year period in
state law and in the case law interpretations of the relevant
determinations, such as the possibly applicable exceptions to the
prescribed period.
Second, if the SOL is at issue,142 presumably via the defending
party’s answer to the initiating complaint143 but in any event before
the hearing starts,144 be prepared to follow up quickly to instruct the
parties as to your expectations for timely arguments, evidence, and
authority specific to the KOSHK date, the underlying action, and any
other SOL factors that may be at issue. In such cases, encourage
stipulations to limit the areas of dispute, and consider whether
bifurcation with a timely interim order would be appropriate instead

(2009), contained a child find claim and that most, unlike Forest Grove, were
premised on compensatory education, not tuition reimbursement. Representing
another ad hoc determination, child find amounts to ascertaining whether the
district had reasonable suspicion of eligibility and, if so, when it was and whether
the district conducted the evaluation within a reasonable period. See, e.g., Perry A.
Zirkel, “Child Find”: The Lore v. the Law, 307 EDUC. L. REP. 574 (2014).
139
See supra text accompanying note 16.
140
See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 3.
141
E.g., Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005).
142
Raising the issue sua sponte may or may not be problematic. See, e.g.,
Perry A. Zirkel, Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers 16
(Jan. 2016), http://www.nasdse.org/Publications/tabid/577/Default.aspx. Similarly,
consider whether having the parties stipulate as to a two-year “look back” period is
advisable.
143
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
144
In jurisdictions that mandate or permit it, a prehearing conference, whether
live or via technology, is best practice for identifying and managing such issues.
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of integrating this issue with the rest of the case.145 If the triggering
date is at issue, make sure the evidence as to the KOSHK date is
sufficiently specific as to when the parents had the necessary facts as
to the particular claim(s).146 If exceptions are at issue, recognize, as a
rebuttable presumption, their judicially construed narrowness.147
Third, if you determine that the parents timely filed one or more
claims, recognize that the period for the denial of FAPE and its
remedy may (or may not) be longer than the period between the
KOSHK date and the filing date, depending on (1) the applicable
interpretation of the alleged action148 and (2) the IHO’s equitable
remedial authority.149
Finally, within the established policy grounds for timeliness
under the SOL generally150 and for IDEA decision-making
specifically,151 make extra but efficient efforts for thorough fact
finding and legal conclusions for SOL determinations, because
appeals are likely until the courts in your jurisdiction arrive at more a
more clearly settled state of the law for these significant and nuanced
issues.152 This issue is an opportunity for IHOs to exert their
expertise and efficiency for the sake of sensible and effective case
law under the IDEA.

145

For the hearing officer’s discretionary authority to provide the parties with a
fair but efficient opportunity for arguments and evidence as to the applicable SOL,
see T.C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 4:13cv186, 2016 WL 705930
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2016).
146
For the possibility of differentiated determinations for multiple claims, see,
e.g., K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
147
See supra notes 57–98 and accompanying text.
148
See supra notes 103–36 and accompanying text.
149
See supra note 26.
150
See supra text accompanying note 16.
151
See supra note 18; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2014) (short timeline
for completing the IHO decision).
152
For the judicial deference accorded to through IHO decisions, see, e.g.,
Pointe Educ. Serv. v. A.T., 610 F. App’x 702 (9th Cir. 2015); Cerra v. Pawling
Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005); Doyle v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 953
F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Sch., 931 F.2d 84 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).

